The Battle over Emotions in Saxony-Anhalt: How Populism Won the State Elections

By Sophia Hofbauer

The state elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern attracted attention far beyond the states’ borders and Germany. In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD emerged as the strongest party with 43.8% of the vote, more than doubling its 2021 result. The CDU fell to just 17.2%, cutting its result in half.

The SPD, Greens and Left each received around nine percent, while BSW entered parliament with slightly more than five percent. Voter turnout reached 77.8%, the highest level since German reunification. At the same time, the CDU was kicked out of the state parliament in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern with only 4.9% of the vote, falling short of the required 5% threshold. The AfD received 38,2%, having the strongest result in this state election as well. This made the election historic in many ways. 

For a large share of voters, this election was clearly not only about state-level politics. 59% of respondents said the federal government deserved a reprimand. Among AfD voters, that figure rose to 89%. This shows that the state election was also understood as a vote on the federal government and on Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz. 

The AfD's Psychological Campaign

A key factor in the AfD's success was the campaign of its lead candidate, Ulrich Siegmund. Siegmund did not present himself only as a conventional politician, but as a political media figure. On TikTok and at public events, he made himself appear friendly, down-to-earth and approachable. He spoke in short, simple messages, with picturesque metaphors and gave the impression of coming directly from people's everyday lives. 

This strategy is psychologically effective. Politics is perceived not only through policies, but also through personalities. Many voters increasingly ask themselves whether they trust a politician, whether that person understands their reality and whether they can identify with them. In this context, a complicated party platform can be less convincing than a short sentence, a personal video or a politician who stages themselves as close to ordinary people. 

Siegmund was significantly more visible on TikTok than his political competitors. A study by the University of Potsdam found that his account accounted for a particularly large share of political attention in Saxony-Anhalt during the campaign. This allowed the AfD to spread its message directly and, to some extent, bypass traditional media.

The campaign was a battle over emotions: trust, anger, belonging and the feeling of finally being understood by someone. The AfD positioned itself as a counterweight to a political establishment it describes as detached and out of touch. At the same time, it simplified complex problems and offered seemingly clear scapegoats and simple solutions. 

This is a typical element of populist communication. Populism often works by contrasting an allegedly “real person” with a political elite. This makes social conflicts easier to understand, but also greatly oversimplified. The AfD combines this narrative with the promise to fundamentally reshape the state and to align political decisions more strongly with national identity. 

However, approachability should not be confused with political openness or democratic inclusiveness. A politician can appear friendly, humorous and accessible while still advocating political positions that would have significant consequences for certain groups. This is where the AfD's communication becomes deceptive. 

This is also evident in the example of Alice Weidel. Her personal biography and public persona do not easily fit the image that the AfD conveys in its migration and social policy. At the same time, Weidel leads a party that demands a significantly stricter migration policy and, in Saxony-Anhalt, has even announced a “deportation and remigration offensive”. After the election, Weidel stated that people with a migration background did not need to fear an AfD government as long as they contributed positively to society. At the same time, the AfD calls for far-reaching restrictions on migration and asylum. 

Approachability is therefore not sufficient proof of inclusive politics. What ultimately matters are the concrete measures a party demands and the consequences these measures would have for society. 

A Serious Signal for Germany

The elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern show that the rise of the far right in Germany cannot be explained solely by individual protest voters or short-term outrage. The AfD has succeeded in combining dissatisfaction, social anxieties and the desire for political change with a particularly effective personal and media strategy. 

At the same time, it would be overly simplistic to interpret every vote for the AfD purely as approval of all the party's positions. Many voters wanted to send a message to the federal government, while others no longer felt represented by the established parties. This explains the AfD's success, but it does not excuse the political consequences of its strength. 

The central challenge for democratic parties is therefore to become more credible, understandable and reachable again. They must address political problems concretely without adopting populist simplifications. 

The AfD did not win only because of its programme. It also won because it gave many people the feeling of being seen and understood, which is why the results must be taken so seriously. The democratic response cannot consist of just copying the AfD. It must start with addressing the causes of dissatisfaction and becoming more approachable. Yet it also has to be mentioned that Berlin voted for a new House of Representatives, and in stark contrast, the Left emerged as the strongest party. While Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern highlight the growing strength of the far right in eastern Germany, Berlin underscored how different regional dynamics can produce very different political outcomes.

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