The Legal Risks of EU Return Hubs and Who Is Responsible

By Anastasiia Sheremok

Last year, the European Union made its political priority to increase the number of returns of ‘irregularly staying third-country nationals’ (TCNs). On 12 June 2026, after years of negotiations between EU member states, the new Pact on Migration and Asylum finally entered into application. At almost the same time, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU reached a provisional political agreement on a separate Regulation establishing a Common European System for Returns, intended to complete its migration-management architecture.

Its most controversial part is the use of so-called 'return hubs' — offshore detention centres in non-EU countries, intended to temporarily accommodate TCNs ordered to leave the EU or denied entry. Despite the term 'return hubs' not being mentioned in the final text, the law reframes the original proposal from the European Commission. This law now allows certain TCNs subject to return decisions to be transferred to countries with which they have no prior connection, where they could await deportation for up to two years. The first return hub, whose location has yet to be announced, would likely be used by the Netherlands, Greece, Germany, Austria, and Denmark, all countries that have backed a push to crack down on migration into the EU.

Under Article 3(5) of the Treaty of the EU, the EU is committed to the ‘strict observance and development of international law.’ In her Opinion of 11 June 2026 in Joined Cases C-706/25 and C-707/25, Comeri and Sidilli, Advocate General Medina stated EU law does not forbid member states from establishing centres outside the bloc. EU asylum law, she noted, does not specify that 'detention centres' for asylum-seekers cannot be 'outside the territory of the Union' (para. 32). 

What Is The Problem, Then?

There has been growing concern: it does not seem realistic that the reception conditions at return hubs would fully respect human rights. Eda Gemi, an expert on migration law at the University of New York in Tirana, stated that 'the issue is not the existence of the facilities per se, but whether the legal architecture surrounding them adequately guarantees detainees’ rights, including access to asylum procedures, legal remedies, judicial oversight, and protection against arbitrary detention.’

First of all, several third countries to which TCNs are sent either have not joined the Refugee Convention, have only done so partially, lack an effective asylum system, or do not officially recognise refugee status.

Member of the European Parliament Maria Walsh, who voted against the ‘return hubs’ policy, said that given the lack of respect for human rights in some of the EU’s existing agreements with third countries, she was not convinced that references to human rights guarantees or safeguards would translate in practice. Indeed, priority partners of the EU, such as Turkey, Cameroon, Algeria, and Angola, have been accused of refoulement and collective migrant expulsions in violation of international human rights law, and have been regularly condemned by UNHCR and NGOs. Third countries hosting 'return hubs' were often unable to accurately assess whether returnees needed international protection or faced a risk of harm if deported. 

For example, the Italy-Albania protocol was widely criticised for raising serious human rights issues. In 2024, the European Ombudsman found that EU-funded border management activities carried out under the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding had resulted in human rights violations. While Tunisian authorities exercised operational control, the EU contributed to these practices through funding and strategic support.

According to MEP Walsh, these violations are now highly predictable and should be foreseen, especially by countries with the information and resources to do so.

Secondly, even if EU Member States refrain from returning TCNs to countries that may persecute them, there is a risk that returnees may be expelled onward to countries where they can be persecuted. Such chain returns are called ‘indirect’ refoulement and are prohibited under international human rights law (p. 8). As clarified by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  (art. 8) and the Committee against Torture (para. 12), states must assess whether removal to a transit country entails a real risk of onward return to persecution or torture. It remains unclear whether the safeguards established are sufficient to ensure a meaningful assessment of risks of indirect refoulement before a person is transferred to a return hub.

Civil society even draws comparisons to the tactics of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Trump administration’s deals with countries like El Salvador to receive deported migrants, calling the policy an ‘ICE-style enforcement’. Greta Thunberg recently posted on social media, agreeing with the comparison.

Who Bears Responsibility?

Under Article 4(2)(j) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU and its Member States operate within a framework of shared competence in migration matters. The Union is required, under Article 3(5) of the Treaty of the EU, to contribute to the strict observance and development of international law. Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provide for non-refoulement. However, holding the EU responsible remains difficult due to its exclusion from international adjudicatory bodies and its reliance on Member States for enforcement.

In contrast, Member States are directly bound by treaties such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture and may incur international responsibility under Articles 2 and 16 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts for either directly violating non-refoulement or aiding other states in doing so.

Conclusion

EU and international law do not necessarily prohibit every facility situated outside Union territory. They do, however, prohibit the Union and its Member States from using territorial externalisation to externalise legal responsibility, weaken effective judicial protection, or expose individuals to foreseeable direct or indirect refoulement.